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1. Introduction 
History is replete with cases of intentional, systematic, and substantial destruction of 
noncombant civilians by powerful elites including dictatorial and nondictatorial governments and 
nonstate groups (e.g., rebel, militia, and terrorist organizations). In just the last 120 years, some 
200 mass atrocities have occurred in which at least 100 million civilians have been intentionally 
killed (and likely at least half of a billion people killed, injured, or traumatized) by political 
leaders and their fellow perpetrators (Anderton and Brauer, 2018). A substantial literature is now 
emerging on economic aspects of mass atrocities to complement the already well-developed 
literatures offered in other social sciences and in the humanities (Anderton and Brauer, 2016, 
2018). Furthermore, theories and models of social and economic networks in particular have 
burst on the scene in the last quarter century and they are updating economists’ understanding of 
a wide range of economic activities including peer effects in education, hub and spoke 
transportation systems, job search and employment outcomes, the diffusion of information, 
innovations, and ideas, the roles of interpersonal relationships in market outcomes, and the 
behaviors of criminal groups including illicit drug trading and human trafficking organizations 
(Jackson, 2008; Easley and Kleinberg, 2010; Bramoullé, Galeotti, and Rogers, 2016). Moreover, 
formal networking models are now being developed to analyze conflict on networks including 
wars and terrorism (Cunningham, 1985; Baccara and Bar-Isaac, 2008; Franke and Öztürk, 2009; 
Maoz, 2011; Enders and Sandler, 2012; Goyal and Vigier, 2014; Dziubinski, Goyal, and Vigier, 
2016; Acemoglu, Malekian, and Ozdaglar, 2016; Zech and Gabbay, 2016; König, Rohner, 
Thoenig, and Zilibotti, 2017; Scaife, 2017; Terrorism Network Project, 2018). Surprisingly, 
however, few formal networking models have been applied to mass atrocities. Such applications 
are warranted because mass atrocities are orchestrated by architects over networks of 
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perpetrators, play out in locales based upon networks of relationships among perpetrators and 
resisters, and involve networks between and within both victims and potential rescuers.  
Network theory has shown economists and other social scientists that one cannot simply 
add up the micro actions of individual agents to surmise a macro outcome. Keynes already taught 
us this with the Paradox of Thrift: When all agents in a macroeconomy attempt to save more, 
consumption and employment could fall, leading to less savings overall. Neither can one 
necessarily surmise the underlying micro preferences of individuals from any observed macro, 
system-wide outcome (Schelling, 1971, 1978; Granovetter, 1978). Much depends on what the 
network literature calls the aggregation function. 
Most importantly for our purposes, network theory can explain certain puzzles associated 
with mass atrocities. First, while social psychologists have long known that it can be frightfully 
easy to recruit relatively small numbers of people to commit atrocious acts (e.g., Roth, 2010), 
how can one explain the more puzzling mass participation in mass atrocity? Network theory can 
explain this scaling up. Second, when a mass atrocity such as a genocide breaks out, why can it 
spread like wildfire in location A yet stay contained in location B even though the individuals in 
the two locations are essentially the same (even identical) in their initial perspectives on what 
should happen to the outgroup? Network theory can provide insights on the very uneven spread 
of mass atrocities at the grassroots level. A third puzzle is this: Why do some individuals in mass 
atrocities “flip”, i.e., change from perpetrator to rescuer (as did Oskar Schindler) or from rescuer 
to perpetrator? Fourth, seemingly even more puzzling is the observation in mass atrocity contexts 
that some individuals rescue and perpetrate at the same time (Campbell, 2010; Donà, 2018). 
Fifth, why do some people who are strongly opposed to acts of mass atrocity nonetheless help 
commit them (Browning, 2004) and thereby help perpetuate an atrocity norm (Michaeli and 
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Spiro, 2017)? Sixth, why do some perpetrators, after the fact, display what is almost certainly 
genuine remorse and, sometimes, sincere candidness that they are shocked at what they did 
(Gobodo-Madikizela, 2002; Staub, 2005; Wilson, 2010)? Seventh, what explains the “silence of 
the majority” in many mass atrocity cases? Social network theory provides compelling insights 
into all these aspects, perspectives, and behaviors without appealing to wildly changing or 
bizarre preferences or circumstances (e.g., Schelling, 1971; Granovetter, 1978; Gintis, 2009). 
At the core of many mass atrocities lies a struggle that plays out within the in-group 
(Kleinschmidt, 1972; Straus, 2006; Adalian, 2009; Lemarchand, 2009; Ray, 2017) over whether 
the in-group will seek to eliminate some or all of the out-group. If in-group extremists “win” this 
struggle, mass atrocity commences. This struggle that transpires on the threshold of mass atrocity 
is a diffusion process. Either atrocity acceptance diffuses to a relatively high level within the in-
group beyond which a threshold is crossed or else atrocity acceptance is nullified. To model this 
preliminary stage of mass atrocity, we begin with the Bass (1969) model of diffusion and then 
add network aspects of diffusion to this starting point. Assuming that mass atrocity commences, 
we then offer network modeling of such commencement. Specifically, we offer a stylized linear 
quadratic model (LQM) of mass atrocity propagation over geographic space along networked 
“tentacles” of destruction. Among the model’s key results is the dramatic increase in destruction 
of the out-group that is “afforded” by a “network production function” (which is a comparable 
concept to a classic production function in standard economic theory). Finally, we add to the 
network model the contending actions of networked resisters. In so doing, we evaluate certain 
policies that can degrade the atrocity-perpetrating network, but we also show how a network 
context can cause certain prevention efforts to backfire and do more harm than good to afflicted 
civilians. 
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2. Models of Diffusion among a Population 
2.1 The Bass Model of Product Diffusion 
2.1.1 Difference Equation and Diffusion Curves 
The notion of contagion or diffusion is the spreading of “something” among a population. The 
“something” might be a disease (e.g., AIDS), an idea (e.g., love your enemy) or opinion (e.g., 
candidate so-and-so is corrupt), information (e.g., there is a great movie playing at the theater), 
or, in our context, the “disease” of atrocity acceptance among people within the in-group. The 
Bass (1969) model is a starting point for analyzing diffusion of products and fashions in the 
marketing literature. Let F(t) be the fraction of some population that has accepted the product at 
time t. Either a person has accepted the product (1) or not (0), so the states of the model are 
binary. Let ρ be the constant rate of spontaneous adoption of a product, sometimes referred to in 
the marketing literature as “early adopters.” In our context, this may refer to instigators (or true 
believers), i.e., people who make an adoption decision independent of social, or peer, effects on 
adoption. Jackson (2008, p. 187) notes that spontaneous adoption can be interpreted as a 
response to outside stimuli such as advertising. Further, let β be the constant rate of imitation. 
This captures peer effects in adopting the product based on social relations. In peer contexts, 
adoption of the product can spread by word-of-mouth in personal encounters, over social media, 
via cell phones, and the like. The basic Bass model then is a purely mechanical, tripartite 
difference equation that describes the acceptance of a product over time among a population as 
follows: 
 𝐹(𝑡) = 𝐹(𝑡 − 1) + 𝜌[1 − 𝐹(𝑡 − 1)] + 𝛽[1 − 𝐹(𝑡 − 1)]𝐹(𝑡 − 1).   (1) 
As mentioned, F(t) on the left-hand side is the fraction of a population that has adopted an item 
or idea at time t. The first element on the right-hand side of the equals sign is the fraction of 
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adopters from the last period, F(t-1), i.e., prior adopters, who are assumed to be adopters 
throughout and thus will continue to be adopters in the current period (t). The next element on 
the right-hand side of the equals sign captures the rate of spontaneous adoption (ρ) among the 
fraction of the population that has not yet adopted the product, i.e., 1−F(t-1). The third element 
on the right side of the equals sign captures the peer aspects of adoption (β) from the social 
interactions between fractions of the population that are nonadopters, 1−F(t−1), and adopters, 
F(t−1), of the product. The parameter β measures the rate of “conversion,” as it were, of 
nonadopters to adopters. Numerous forms of diffusion behavior are possible in the Bass model 
depending on the initial condition for F, i.e., F(0), the rate of spontaneous adoption (ρ), and the 
rate of imitation (β). Figure 1 shows five such diffusion curves. Four of the curves assume 
F(0)=0 (no true believers to begin with) while one assumes F(0)=0.2 (20% of the population, to 
begin with). 
[Figure 1 about here]  
2.1.2 Diffusion of Atrocity Acceptance in the Bass Model 
Several intuitive applications of the Bass model to mass atrocities present themselves in Figure 
1. First, atrocity architects can manipulate the contagion of atrocity acceptance within the in-
group though advertising, i.e., propaganda. Such actions serve to increase the spontaneous rate of 
adoption (ρ) which pertains to people adopting an idea independent of peer or social influences. 
(For a review of this aspect see, e.g., Petrova and Yanagizawa-Drott 2016.) For the Rwandan 
genocide of 1994, Yanagizawa-Drott (2014), for instance, studies the role of hate radio (Radio 
Télévision Libre des Mille Collines, RTLM, as opposed to Radio Rwanda which did not 
broadcast inflammatory material) as a coordination device to incite violence. To arrive at 
statistically credible results, he exploits the quasi-random geographic distribution of hills, 
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flatlands, and valleys that affects the relative quality of signal reception. Holding other factors 
constant, communities in reach of a clear line-of-signal indeed showed a statistically significant 
(and quantitatively large) increase in genocide participation. Moreover, due to spatial spillovers 
on social interaction networks, so did neighboring communities, suggesting coordination and 
triggering effects facilitated by hate radio. He estimates that about 10 percent of the participation 
in the violence is attributable to RTML. This translates to an additional 51,000 perpetrators. (The 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda later convicted the radio station’s founders of 
instigating genocide.) 
Note in Figure 1 the significant increase in the diffusion curve from the one labeled 
ρ=0.01, β=0 to the one labeled ρ=0.04, β=0. At time t=50, the former curve has “only” a 39.5 
percent adoption rate of the atrocity norm within the in-group, but the latter curve has a rate of 
87.0 percent. Clearly, the model suggests that propaganda will be an important tool in the hands 
of atrocity architects for diffusing the acceptance of atrocity within the in-group. 
 Second, independent of spontaneous adoption, peer or social effects on adoption of 
atrocity also greatly matter. Notice the change in adoption curves when moving from ρ=0.01, 
β=0 to ρ=0.01, β=0.04 to ρ=0.01, β=0.1. At time t=50 across these three curves, the rate of 
adoption rises from 39.5 percent to 69.0 percent to 95.9 percent. Furthermore, the emergence of 
an S-shape adoption curve requires that sufficiently strong peer effects be present. The S-shape 
of a diffusion curve is important in the marketing literature because it reflects that part of a 
diffusion process in which acceptance is increasing at an increasing rate before it eventually 
increases at a diminishing rate. Numerous cases studies of mass atrocities reflect a dramatic 
uptick in mass atrocity acceptance within the in-group generally and in specific locales in which 
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mass atrocity perpetration takes off suddenly (Browning, 1992, ch. 8; Des Forges, 1999; Fujii, 
2009).  
 Thirdly, the initial fraction of adopters, F(0), determines the height of the launching pad 
for diffusion. In Figure 1, the difference between the ρ=0.01, β=0.1, F(0)=0 and ρ=0.01, β=0.1, 
F(0)=0.2 curves is quite dramatic. At time t=20, the former curve’s fraction of adoption is 40.5 
percent, while the latter’s is 75.0 percent. Assuming that F(0) is the fraction of the population 
predisposed to atrocity acceptance (potential true believers), even before there is one, then once 
atrocity begins they help feed the peer aspects of the Bass model right from the get-go, leading to 
rapid diffusion in a relatively short time. If time is measured in days, then the top diffusion curve 
in Figure 1 reaches 50 percent acceptance by day 11. Meanwhile, the lower diffusion curve in the 
figure reaches 50 percent adoption by day 69. These are dramatically different diffusion 
scenarios with drastically different third party intervention prospects. If policy efforts are 
reactive, perhaps even timely by the standards of international policymaking, then the diffusion 
along the top curve will likely be well on its way before policy intervenes and attempts to make a 
difference. Such a scenario will tend to be a policy that is too little, too late.  
 Although we have applied ideas from the Bass model to an overall intra-group struggle 
over atrocity policy, diffusion processes matter greatly at the grass roots level, too. Hence, we 
will return to processes of diffusion at local levels once we have developed the model of atrocity 
tentacles reaching into locales later on in this article. 
2.1.3 The Bass Model and Atrocity Prevention 
Assume initially that we have nonnegative values for the rate of spontaneous adoption (ρ), the 
rate of imitation (β), and the initial fraction of adopters (F(0)) in the Bass model. Prevention of 
diffusion of atrocity acceptance in the population requires that the rate of spontaneous adoption 
8 
 
(ρ) and the initial fraction of adopters (F(0)) be zero or that the rate of spontaneous adoption (ρ) 
and the rate of imitation (β) be zero. These are heroic assumptions to expect of a population of 
relatively large size (such as a village). There will almost always be some people with an 
exogenous animus toward people from the out-group, implying ρ>0 and F(0)>0. Hence, the 
model suggests a latent potential for atrocity acceptance if the diffusion process is set into 
motion by atrocity architects. As Valentino (2004, p. 2) notes, “the minimum level of social 
support necessary to carry out mass killing has been uncomfortably easy [for leaders] to 
achieve.”  Thus, the model helps explain the first puzzle: how an animosity within a small group 
toward an out-group can mushroom into mass participation across large segements of the 
population. 
 Naturally, if other parties (say third parties) are able to cultivate negative values for ρ and 
for β (or a sufficiently large negative value on one of the parameters), a process of atrocity 
rejection can be fostered as shown in Figure 2. This is true, as the figure shows, even for high 
initial fractions of atrocity adopters, F(0)>>0. Policies that might make ρ and/or β negative 
include counter-propaganda campaigns to offset and turn around hate radio, threats of litigation 
against those who adopt atrocity actions against the out-group, insertion of third party 
peacekeepers to reduce F(0) and turn ρ and/or β toward negative values. It is also important to 
note how the ultimate outcomes in the Bass model can vary dramatically based upon a seemingly 
trivial change in a parameter. For example, the ρ=0.01, β=−0.03 diffusion curve in Figure 2 will 
eventually reach an outcome in which the whole population is atrocity acceptant (F=1) (not 
shown) as the negative peer effect parameter is not strong enough to overcome the initial true 
believer parameter. Yet, if a slightly more negative imitation parameter of β=−0.04 was in place 
(all else equal), then the ρ=0.01, β=−0.04 diffusion curve in Figure 2 would reach an outcome in 
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which the whole population rejected atrocity (F=0) (not shown). Hence, the ultimate fate of an 
intra-group struggle in a locale, whether it tips to atrocity acceptance or rejection, can be 
extremely sensitive to initial conditions and small parameter changes. This helps explain the 
second puzzle, why mass participation in an atrocity can spread rapidly in one location yet fail to 
diffuse to or in another. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
2.1.4 Epidemiological Models of the Spread of Disease and the Bass Model 
The literature on the spread of diseases over networks of people, animals, and plants is vast 
(Jackson, 2008, 185–221; Newman, 2010, 627–73; Lamberson, 2016). Models of epidemics 
often involve one of four epidemiological models known by their acronyms—SI, SIR, SIS, and 
SIRS—where “S” stands for “susceptible,” “I” for “infected,” and R for “recovered.” We leave 
applications of such models to mass atrocity to future research, but we do so with three caveats. 
First, the SI model from the epidemiology literature is a special case of the Bass model in which 
the spontaneous adoption parameter (ρ) is set to zero. Second, while there are important 
examples in mass atrocity contexts of individuals who were susceptible, became infected with 
mass atrocity perpetration, and then recovered (i.e., the SIR model, e.g., Oskar Schindler, and 
thus addressing the third puzzle), far more common are cases of people becoming habituated and 
“locked in” (unrecoverable) to atrocity through various social psychological processes such as 
the “foot in the door phenomenon,” “motivated rationalizations of atrocity actions,” and peer 
group effects (Waller, 2007). If we assume, then, that most or all of those who become infected 
stay infected (which puts us in the Bass world), then the fraction of those infected (assuming, for 
instance, non-negative ρ and β in the Bass model in which at least one of the two parameters is 
positive) always goes to one. This stark outcome is not a realistic description of mass atrocity 
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contexts in which there are always some who remain immune (i.e., resisters) regardless of how 
many others in the population become infected (i.e., perpetrators). In short, the third caveat is 
that the diffusion process in the Bass model needs to be generalized to account for polymorphic 
outcomes. To do so, we turn to analysis of a generalized S-shaped model of diffusion. 
2.2 Generalized S-Shaped Model of Atrocity Diffusion and Prevention 
In this subsection, we adopt the Easley and Kleinberg (2010, ch. 17) model of diffusion of a new 
product in the marketplace and adapt it to the context of diffusion of atrocity acceptance among a 
population encompassing an in-group. In so doing, we develop a general S-shaped model of 
diffusion in which the diffusion curves generated by the Bass model are special cases. The S-
shaped model also generates insights into atrocity rejection among the in-group population. 
2.2.1 Intrinsic Valuation of Atrocity Perpetration 
Following Easley and Kleinberg (2010, p. 450), assume each individual from the in-group 
population has a “name” given as a real number between 0 and 1, that the number of such 
individuals is finite, and that the total mass of such individuals is 1. The set of individuals with 
names between 0 and x (where x≤1) represents the fraction x of the in-group population. Assume 
each individual x has a spontaneous or intrinsic interest in participating in acts of harm against 
the out-group as represented by a reservation value, r(x), for participation. The higher the 
reservation value for any given cost of participation, the more likely the individual would prefer 
to be an atrocity perpetrator rather than an abstainer. Overriding cost considerations, some 
individuals may have very high reservation values for participation owing to latent hatred of the 
out-group. Others might have zero reservation values and, all else equal, would not participate no 
matter how low the cost. Still others might find some intrinsic value in participating in harm 
against the out-group owing to looting opportunities. Since reservation values can vary across 
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individuals in the population, heterogeneous preferences are implied. Each individual x’s 
intrinsic reservation valuation, r(x), is independent of any peer or network effects that might 
cause the individual to value participation differently (this network element will be introduced 
shortly).  
 Assume that an atrocity architect would like to recruit individuals into atrocity 
perpetration. The potential availability of personnel would be based on an aggregate reservation 
value function such as shown in Figure 3. This curve (which, for convenience, is drawn as a 
straight line) can be thought of as the “market demand” curve for participating in atrocity by 
potential recruits. The demand for atrocity perpetration is given by the reservation valuation 
function, r(x), for the range of individuals between 0 and 1. The cost of participating in atrocity, 
c, involves the cost of effort and, for at least some actors, unpleasant side effects from harming 
people from the out-group. In most (civil) societies, atrocity actions are crimes subject to the 
costs of prosecution and the possibility of incarceration. In such societies, c would be high and 
few individuals would participate in hate crimes. In societies in which political leaders seek to 
foster atrocity, however, the cost of participation might be lowered owing to decriminalization of 
hate crimes against out-groups. In addition, propaganda might be used to increase the reservation 
values (demand) associated with atrocity participation. In Figure 3, the combination of the 
aggregate demand, or society-wide reservation valuation, curve and the cost of atrocity 
perpetration gives rise to the fraction x of the in-group participating and the fraction (1−x) not 
participating. If the cost of atrocity perpetration is c1=0.25 as shown in the figure, individuals 
with names between 0 and x1=0.75 will become perpetrators and individuals with names greater 
than x1=0.75 will not. (If we draw the reservation valuation curve in the figure such that it turns 
down and intersects the horizontal axis before reaching individual 1, it would imply that some 
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individuals would not participate in atrocity even if the cost of doing so is c=0.) Note that the 
implied reservation value function in Figure 3 is r(x)=1−x. This, of course, is a special case of a 
more general down-sloping reservation value function. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
2.2.2 Network Effects in the Model 
The analysis in Figure 3 ignores network effects in which the atrocity participation of one or 
more members of the population can alter the valuation of atrocity perpetration of others in the 
population. We now add network benefits from atrocity perpetration to the intrinsic benefits 
shown in Figure 3. Assume now that individual x’s valuation of atrocity perpetration involves its 
spontaneous or intrinsic valuation, r(x), and its benefit from having a fraction z of the in-group 
population on board, with the atrocity architect’s aims represented by the value function f(z) in 
which f(0)=0 and f ʹ(z)>0. This peer-effect function, f, captures the network benefits available to 
individuals from in-group participation (for example, benefits from peer support, information 
flows, ability to rationalize participation when others are participating, and so on). Here z 
represents individuals’ shared expectation of the fraction of the population that will adopt 
atrocity perpetration. The modified reservation value for adoption of any individual x from the 
in-group will now be r(x)f(z), i.e., own-benefits times peer-mediated benefits flowing to the 
individual, where the multiplicative form implies that individuals with high intrinsic value from 
atrocity perpetration benefit the most from increases in the fraction of the population that 
participates (Easley and Kleinberg, 2010, p. 455). A self-fulfilling expectations equilibrium is 
one in which the people in the population expect the fraction z to adopt perpetration and the 
fraction that actually adopts also is z (Easely and Kleinberg, 2010, p. 454). For any given cost of 
atrocity perpetration, say c=2, what value (or values) of z will be an equilibrium in this self-
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fulfilling sense? We can immediately establish that z=0 will be a self-fulfilling expectations 
equilibrium. If everybody expects a proportion z=0 of the population to perpetrate, then the 
reservation value for each individual x is r(x)f(z)=r(x)f(0)=r(x)0=0. In this case, each individual’s 
valuation for participation is zero and thus less than the cost, r(x)f(z)=0<c=2, so that nobody in 
the population has an incentive to participate and the shared expectation of z=0 indeed is fulfilled 
(Easley and Kleinberg, 2010, p. 454). 
 Might there be a positive value (or values) of z that would be a self-fulfilling expectations 
equilibrium? The answer will depend on the nature of the r and f functions and the cost of 
atrocity adoption. To answer the question, consider the following special cases for the two 
functional forms. Suppose as above in Figure 3 that the r function takes the form r(x)=1−x. 
Recall that z is the society-wide expectation of the fraction of the population that will participate. 
Since everybody (including person z) expects that person with number name z will adopt 
atrocity, it follows that all individuals with number names x<z will be expected to adopt atrocity. 
Hence, all individuals from 0 to z will have an intrinsic reservation value of at least r(z)=1−z. Let 
the f function of network benefits be f(z)=12.5z. Figure 4 plots the aggregate reservation value 
function r(z)f(z)=(1−z)(12.5z) across various levels of expectations z, assuming that the cost of 
participation is c=2. Given the specific functional form for reservation value, if nobody in the 
population is expected to participate then, to repeat, there are no network benefits, f(0)=0, and 
thus the reservation value for each person is r(z)f(z)=r(z)(0)=0. In this case, each individual’s 
valuation for participation is less than the cost, r(z)f(z)=0<c=2, so nobody in the population has 
an incentive to participate. Hence, when no one is expected to participate, no one will value 
participation, and a shared expectation of z=0 is a self-fulfilling expectations equilibrium as 
already established above.  
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 What other self-fulling expectations equilibriums exist in Figure 4? Suppose the atrocity 
architects are able to jump over the “hurdle” of z=0 expectations of the population and foster an 
expectation fraction of participation of zʹ=0.2 in Figure 4. The reservation valuation for the 
person with number name zʹ=0.2 will adopt perpetration because his reservation valuation just 
meets the cost, r(z)f(z)=(1−z)(12.5z)=(1−0.2)(12.5)(0.2)=2=c. Further, all individuals with 
number names less than 0.2 will also adopt because their reservation valuations will be greater 
than 2. For example, person 0.1’s reservation value will be (1−0.1)(12.5)(0.2)=2.25>c=2. 
Individuals with number names greater than 0.2 will not adopt perpetration as their reservation 
valuations will be less than 2. For example, person 0.3’s reservation value will be 
(1−0.3)(12.5)(0.2)=1.75<c=2. Hence, if all individuals in the population expect a zʹ=0.2 fraction 
of the population to adopt perpetration, then that fraction will indeed adopt and individuals with 
number names above zʹ=0.2 will not. Hence, the shared expectation zʹ=0.2 will be fulfilled. But 
note that there is another self-fulling z equilibrium in Figure 4, namely at zʹʹ=0.8. If all 
individuals in the population expect that fraction of adoption, then all individuals with number 
names between 0 and 0.8 will adopt. The last adopter in the segment will be person 0.8, whose 
reservation valuation just meets the cost r(z)f(z)=(1−z)(12.5z)=(1−0.8)(12.5)(0.8)=2=c. Persons 
with names above 0.8 will not adopt perpetration because their reservation valuations will be less 
than 2. For example, person 0.9’s reservation value will be (1−0.9)(12.5)(0.9)=1.125<c=2. 
Hence, Figure 4 shows three possible self-fulfilling expectations equilibria, namely at z=0, at 
zʹ=0.2, and at zʹʹ=0.8.  
[Figure 4 about here] 
 Continuing with Figure 4, explore now the stability and tipping point properties of the 
three equilibria. Consider the equilibrium given by the origin point in Figure 4. This is a stable 
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equilibrium. Suppose the population temporarily adopts a small positive expectations fraction 
z=ε>0. In this case, the highest value of atrocity perpetration on the curve would be less than the 
cost, so the highest valuing individual, and thus all others, would not participate. In this case, the 
outcome would move back to the origin. Consider next the zʹ=0.2 equilibrium. Suppose the 
population temporarily adopts a slightly smaller expected fraction of atrocity perpetration z= 
zʹ−ε<0.2.  Since the curve in Figure 4 lies below the cost line at zʹ−ε<0.2, the highest valuing 
individual would not adopt atrocity perpetration and, thus, nobody else would either. As such, 
the outcome would gravitate to the origin. Thus, zʹ=0.2 is an unstable equilibrium. But suppose 
the population temporarily adopted a slightly larger expectations fraction z= zʹ+ε>0.2.Since the 
curve in Figure 4 lies above the cost line at zʹ+ε>0.2, individual zʹ+ε prefers adoption over 
abstention and thus becomes an adopter. Since that individual has come on board, network 
benefits from adoption have been notched up (f ʹ>0), so that the next individual above zʹ+ε will 
adopt and so on until the last adopter is reached in chain reaction fashion, namely person zʹʹ. Yet 
individuals with names above zʹʹ would have reservation valuations from adoption that are less 
than the cost of adoption as shown by the portion of the curve on the right side of Figure 4 lying 
below the cost line. In sum, these results establish that zʹ is an unstable equilibrium and z=0 and 
zʹʹ are stable equilibria.  
 Four important points follow in regard to atrocity propagation and prevention in Figure 4. 
First, equilibrium zʹ (being unstable) is a critical point or a tipping point for the “success” of 
atrocity propagation. If the number of atrocity adopters somehow reaches zʹ+ε, then upward 
pressure (or demand) for additional agents to become perpetrators will be set into motion as the 
society moves from the zʹ+ε fraction of adoption to a much higher rate of participation at zʹʹ. 
Second, atrocity architects will attempt to get their societies “over the hump” of resistance to 
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atrocity such that the much higher equilibrium of participation occurs. Third, by manipulating 
the elements of the model, atrocity architects can attempt to achieve the high participation they 
seek. For example, by lowering the cost of atrocity participation (reduce c), the zʹ equilibrium 
will decline (move left in the figure), thus making it easier to get over the hump. Moreover, the 
zʹʹ equilibrium will increase (move right), thus implying a greater rate of participation once the 
hump is gotten over. If cost is unchanging or given, atrocity architects nonetheless could attempt 
to shift the curve in Figure 4 upward by increasing actors’ intrinsic valuations for atrocity, r, and 
by promoting greater network benefits from atrocity, f. Just as if costs had been reduced, such 
actions also would serve to reduce zʹ and increase zʹʹ. Finally, fourth, atrocity preventers want to 
do the opposite of the architects; specifically, they would like the cost, c, to be high enough, and 
the r and f valuation functions to be low enough, so that the cost line in Figure 4 lies everywhere 
above the curve. 
2.3 Derivation of S-Shaped Diffusion Curve 
Following the groundwork that has been laid, we can now derive an S-shaped diffusion curve 
based upon the foregoing modeling. Recall that z symbolizes the expected fraction of the 
population that will adopt atrocity perpetration and that this expectation is shared by all 
individuals from the in-group. Just because z is what everybody expects does not imply that z 
will be the actual rate of adoption at a point in time. Let ?̂? be the fraction of the population that 
solves the equation 𝑟(?̂?)𝑓(𝑧) = 𝑐 where all other terms are as described above. Note that since 
person ?̂? just adopts atrocity (because ?̂?’s reservation valuation is just equal to the cost), all 
individuals from 0 up to ?̂? will adopt also. Assuming the functional forms for r and f from above, 
the equality condition then is: 
 (1 − ?̂?)(12.5𝑧) = 𝑐.         (2) 
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Solving (2) for ?̂? gives: 
 ?̂? = 1 −
𝑐
12.5𝑧
 .         (3) 
Note in (3) that if the term to the right of the minus sign is greater than 1, then ?̂? is negative and 
falls outside the bounds of the model. Hence, equation (3) governs the relationship between the 
shared expectation of the population, z, and the actual rate of adoption, ?̂?, assuming c/12.5z≤1. If 
this condition does not hold, then ?̂?=0. More generally, let the right-hand side of the equality in 
(3) be represented by the g(z) function. The general relationship between ?̂? and z will then be: 
 ?̂? = 𝑔(𝑧)  , when the restraint condition holds 
            (4) 
 ?̂?=0  , otherwise. 
 
 We demonstrate how the model now leads to an S-shaped curve in Figure 5 based upon 
equation (3) and the restraint condition c/12.5z≤1 under the assumption that c=2. First, note that 
the restraint condition will not be met for values of z<0.16. Hence, for population-wide 
expectations of 0 ≤ z < 0.16, the actual rate of adoption will be ?̂?=0. We are then led to the 
diffusion curve shown in Figure 5 (the 45
0
 line will be explained shortly). On the X axis, we 
measure at a point in time the population’s shared expectation of atrocity adoption, z. The 
diffusion curve then shows, given z, what the actual outcome of atrocity adoption, ?̂?, will be as 
measured on the Y axis. For example, if z=0.1 as shown on the graph, then the actual atrocity 
adoption, ?̂?, in that period will be ?̂? = 0. Suppose z=0.3 as shown on the graph. The diffusion 
curve then shows that the actual atrocity adoption rate will be ?̂? > 0.3 because the diffusion 
curve lies above the 45
0
 line when z=0.3. Assuming myopic adjustment in expectations among 
the population (not an unreasonable assumption for a large population), the new expectation of 
atrocity adoption in the next period will be z=?̂? as traced over to the 450 line (call that z-value z2). 
As the graph shows, when z=z2, the actual atrocity adoption rate will be ?̂? > 𝑧2 because the 
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diffusion curve lies above the 45
0
 line when z=z2. This process of expectations and valuation 
adjustment will continue until the expected and actual rates of adoption are equal at ?̂? = 𝑧ʹʹ =
0.8. Figure 5 implies stable equilibria at z values of 0 and 0.8 and a critical point (unstable 
equilibrium) at a z value of 0.2. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
2.5 Comparative Statics  
As before, the comparative static properties of the diffusion curve in Figure 5 boil down to 
elements that would change the cost of atrocity adoption, c, shift or rotate the intrinsic valuation 
curve, r, or shift the network valuation curve, f. For example, suppose the cost of atrocity 
adoption increases from c=2.0 to c=4.0, all else equal. This will cause the diffusion curve to lie 
everywhere below the 45
0
 line as shown in Figure 6. The result will be no acceptance of atrocity 
in the population at all, i.e., there will be a unique and stable equilibrium at ?̂? = 𝑧 = 0. The exact 
same diffusion curve and result would obtain if c remained at 2 but the intrinsic valuation for 
adoption function was cut in half, from r=1−x to r=0.5(1−x). If instead, the c value and the r 
function were unchanged but the value for adoption from network effects was cut in half, from 
f=12.5z to f=6.25z, again the exact same diffusion curve and result would obtain as in the figure. 
Of course, if c was to fall enough and, simultaneously, the valuation functions increase enough, 
then a result could emerge in which the diffusion curve lies mostly or even everywhere above the 
45
0
 line, thus leading to a high or complete diffusion of atrocity adoption. For example, in Figure 
7 the cost of atrocity adoption is reduced from c=2 to c=1 and the networking function changed 
to f(z)=3+12.5z
2
. Reflecting perhaps a not unrealistic scenario, note that for this new networking 
function, networking benefits will exist even when z=0 (i.e., f(0)=3) and networking benefits 
increase at an increasing rather than constant rate as given by the z
2
 term. The g function 
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becomes g(z)=1−(1/12.5z2).  The result is an extremely high fraction of adoption at z*=0.93. This 
outcome is a unique and stable equilibrium.
1
 
[Figure 6 about here] 
[Figure 7 about here] 
2.6 Statement of the General Model 
We can now state a general formulation of the S-shaped model. The diffusion curve can come in 
many shapes, but such curves will be generated from the spontaneous or intrinsic valuation 
function of individuals in the population, i.e., the r(x) function in our case, and the networking 
benefits function, f(z) in our case. The aggregated benefits function could be multiplicative, i.e., 
r(x)f(z), but this need not be so. Many functional forms for the aggregate benefits function are 
possible depending on the functional forms for r and f. Assuming reasonable properties of the r 
and f functions (specifically rʹ<0 and fʹ>0),2 a diffusion curve will be implied that will generally 
be nonlinear, will have an S-shape (i.e., with segments that at first increase at an increasing rate 
and then increase at a diminishing rate), and will lie everywhere above, everywhere below, or 
intersect the 45
0
 line one or more times. When the diffusion curve intersects the 45
0
 line from 
below, the result will be an unstable equilibrium, which will be a tipping point on either side of 
which the population behavior moves to a stable equilibirum. When the diffusion curve intersects 
the 45
0
 line from above, the result will be a stable equilibrium as deviations from that point in 
either direction move the dynamics of the behavior back to the equilibrium. The dynamic 
behavior of atrocity adoption in the population can be analyzed graphically as we have done 
                                                          
1
 Unlike an earlier example, given the specific functional forms that we have been working with, 100 percent 
adoption will not occur unless the cost of adoption is zero. Other functional forms, however, could give rise to the 
diffusion curve lying everywhere above the 45
0
 line even at positive cost, thus giving a unique and stable 
equilibrium at z*=1. 
2
 The expression rʹ<0 refers to a negative (falling) slope and means that the lower the cost, c, the higher the rate of 
adoption. The expression f ʹ>0 refers to a positive (rising) slope and means a rising acceptance of atrocity, given that 
peers have accepted. 
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here. Although pictorial, such analysis is “nevertheless completely rigorous” (Easley and 
Kleinberg, 2010, p. 461). Many pictorial examples of S-shaped diffusion curves in the literature, 
for example those of Schelling (1971, 1978) and Granovetter (1978), can be conceived of as 
examples that fit the framework laid out here. 
3. Models of Diffusion across Networks 
Both the Bass and the generalized S-curve models analyze diffusion with a population, and thus 
ignore detailed structural aspects of social relations among networked individuals. Here we 
explicitly introduce network structure into models of diffusion. Our purpose is to apply network 
models of diffusion to mass atrocity acceptance and mass atrocity rejection across networks (or 
neighborhoods) of individuals.  
3.1Basic Cascade Model of Atrocity Acceptance and Rejection across a Network 
Consider the coordination game between two players (1 and 2) in Figure 8. The two actions 
available to each player in the game in our context are aggression (A) and peace (P) directed 
against an out-group. If agents 1 and 2 each direct aggressive actions against an out-group, they 
each receive a positive payoff a>0. Likewise, if each directs peaceful actions against an out-
group, each receives a positive payoff b>0. However, if the two agents choose opposite actions 
(and thus are uncoordinated), each receives a payoff of 0.  
[Figure 8 about here] 
Again following Easley and Kleinberg (2010, p. 500), assume in Figure 9 that player 1 
would like to maximize its payoff from the pairwise interactions with its five neighbors (players 
2–6). Two of player 1’s neighbors (2 and 3) have chosen to be aggressive toward the out-group 
(they have chosen “A” in Figure 8). Player 1’s other three neighbors (4, 5, and 6) have chosen to 
be peaceful toward the out-group (they have chosen “P” in Figure 8). Assuming that player 1 
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must choose A or P and cannot choose any kind of mixture of the two, what choice would player 
1 make to maximize its payoff? Easley and Kleinberg (2010, p. 501) demonstrate that if at least 
the fraction f=b/(a+b) of player 1’s neighbors choose A, then player 1 will maximize its payoff 
by choosing A also. On the flip side, if less than the fraction f of 1’s neighbors choose A, then 1 
maximizes its payoff by choosing P. As a numerical example, suppose that a=4, b=2. In this 
case, the actual fraction of 1’s neighbors choosing A in Figure 9 is 2/5=0.4 and thus greater than 
f=2/6=0.33. Hence, player 1 will maximize its payoff by choosing A. If, instead, a=2, b=2, the 
actual fraction of 1’s neighbors choosing A (0.4) would be less than f=2/4=0.5, so A would 
maximize its payoff by choosing P. Crucially, Figures 8 and 9 demonstrate that payoffs from 
social interactions and network structure affect what player 1 will do to maximize its payoff. 
These principles can now be generalized to model the contagion of mass atrocity acceptance 
across varying network structures. 
[Figure 9 about here] 
Figure 10 shows friendship ties in a neighborhood of 12 individuals. Assume a crisis hits 
the country in which this neighborhood resides and an authority group attempts to initiate 
atrocity against an out-group. (Neighbor and neighborhood are general terms that need not imply 
a spatial or location neighborhood but can refer to a social network of family, friends, coworkers, 
and so on.) All of the individuals in Figure 10 are from the in-group. In panel (a) we assume 
initially that each individual adopts a posture of peace (P) toward the out-group (ignore the dark 
circles in panel (a) for the moment). Based on Figure 8, this implies that each peaceful neighbor 
achieves a payoff of b from each of its tied neighbors (e.g., player 1 chooses P and has two 
linked neighbors who choose P, so player 1 would receive a payoff of 2b). Suppose now that the 
a and b parameters in Figure 8 are such that the key fraction determining when an individual’s 
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choice of aggression (A) is optimal is f=0.5. This is a relatively malignant threshold in the sense 
that an individual will find it optimal to choose A when only half (or more) of its neighbors 
choose A. Perhaps government authorities have instituted rewards and punishments in this 
society such that a is relatively high and b relatively low in Figure 8, thus giving rise to f=0.5.  
 Assume now in panel (a) of Figure 10 that, for exgenous reasons, individuals 5 and 10 
spontaneously switch to aggression (A). This is indicated by the darkened circles for these agents 
in the figure. Perhaps individuals 5 and 10 were swayed by government propaganda or they were 
given an exogenous side payment to switch to A. Whatever the case, a contagion of atrocity 
acceptance will now unfold. Since 5 is darkened, now half of the neighbors of individuals 3, 4, 6, 
and 7 have chosen A, and so they, too, will choose A (given f=0.5). In panel (b) we thus darken 
the circles for agents 3, 4, 6, and 7 to indicate their conversions to atrocity acceptance. It now 
follows that individuals 1, 2 and 8 have at least half of their neighbors choosing A, so in panel 
(c) they choose A also. In the next round, individual 9 will have at least half of its neighbors as 
atrocity accepters, so 9 will choose A. Finally, the last set of individuals (11 and 12) will convert 
to A for like reason. Hence, we arrive at panel (d) in which all circles are darkened and the whole 
network has become infected with atrocity acceptance.  
[Figure 10 about here] 
 The model described in Figure 10 is a complete model in that it specifies initial 
conditions (agents 5 and 10 adopt A, all others adopt P), a threshold rule rooted in a stage game 
(f=b/(a+b), which was set equal to 0.5), and the dynamic unfolding of contagion until the process 
ends (Easley and Kleinberg, 2010, pp. 501–2). Of course, the specific network structure in 
Figure 10, the stage game in Figure 8, and the threshold rule could be quite different and even 
individualized (i.e., each agent could have its own threshold rule), but the process of working 
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through the contagion in the model would follow the same procedure used here. Given that we 
have a complete model in this sense, we can move on to comparative statics on the model. 
3.2 Comparative Statics of the Basic Cascade Model 
In what follows we consider three comparative statics: (1) change in initial conditions, (2) 
change in payoffs in the stage game and thus change in the threshold rule, and (3) change in 
network links among existing agents. Later we work in additional comparative statics; in 
particular, we will consider immunized agents and key player policy when we use the model in 
Figure 10 to analyze atrocity prevention. Other types of comparative statics—e.g., one-way or 
directed links, incomplete information on links, multiplex links (i.e., some agents choosing A 
vis-à-vis some neighbors and P vis-à-vis other neighbors)—are left for future research. 
 Return to Figure 10(a), but with the proviso that we change one of the initial (exogenous) 
adopters of aggression. Suppose now that agent 4 (along with agent 10) is an initial adopter of A 
rather than agent 5, all else equal. This scenario is shown in Figure 11. Now run the contagion 
process forward through time. Note that none of the agents in the upper cluster of players 
surrounding agent 4 have at least half of their networked neighbors as adopters of A. This is also 
the case for the middle and lower clusters of agents in the figure. In short, there is no contagion 
in Figure 11! This simple result is remarkable. In moving from panel (a) in Figure 10 to Figure 
11, we have not changed the number of the initial adopters of A at time zero, the total number of 
individuals in the network, the structure of neighbor links in the network, or the threshold rule 
for the adoption of A. We merely changed the location on the network of one of the initial 
adopters. Despite this truly trivial change, the effect on the aggregate outcome is dramatic. 
Specifically, this small change in an initial condition caused the aggregate outcome to switch 
from complete contagion to no contagion at all. This captures puzzles 1 to 7 but now in a more 
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complexly specified network and diffusion model. Recall that puzzle 1 asked about how small-
scale atrocity adoption can scale up to mass participation. The details for the diffusion process 
address this. Puzzle 2 asked why one location experiences mass participation while another does 
not. Differences in initial network conditions across different locations can explain this. Puzzle 3 
asked why individual participation may “flip” from adoption to nonadoption. A change in 
conditions, such as when an initially adoping agent moves from location 5 to location 4, can 
explain this. Puzzle 4 asked why individuals can be both persecutors and rescuers. What can 
explain this is that agents are multiplex, that is, they are involved in a variety of networks, each 
with its own conditions, threshold rules, and specific network structures. Puzzle 5 asked why 
some people, who are strongly opposed to acts of mass atrocity, nonetheless help commit them. 
Network theory suggests that peer effects, f(z) or pairwise interaction payoffs, in the network 
may be strong enough to overcome an individual’s reservation value, r(x). Puzzle 6 asked why, 
post-atrocity, some individuals appear to exhibit genuine shock and remorse at their own 
participation. Again, a change in network structure, such as when key agents are removed from 
the network structure, say in the wake of Germany’s defeat in the Second World War, can 
explain this. Puzzle 7 asked what explains the “silence of the majority” in many mass atrocity 
cases, and network theory suggests that particular combinations of initial conditions, threshold 
rules, and network structure can generate such outcomes. The “reductionist” point of models 
such as those described here is to learn whether, beyond case-specific studies of mass atrocities, 
there are general factors common to all (or most) mass atrocities on which general policy 
approaches may focus, at least as a first cut at a specific mass atrocity situation. 
[Figure 11 about here] 
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 Next, in Figure 12 we take as our initial starting point at time zero the situation depicted 
in Figure 11 in which agents 4 and 10 exogenously adopt behavior A, but we change the 
threshold rule from f=½ to f=⅓. Panel (a) of Figure 12 is a reproduction of Figure 11. With the 
even more malignant threshold rule now operative (only ⅓ instead of ½ of neighbors need to 
adopt before the agent in question adopts, perhaps owing to changes in payoffs in the stage game 
in Figure 8 by the atrocity architects), note in panel (b) that agents 1 and 12 now have at least 
one-third of their neighbors as atrocity adopters, so they choose A also. Hence, we darken the 
circles for agents 1 and 12 in panel (b). It then follows in panel (c) that agents 2, 5, 9, and 11 
have at least one-third of their neighbors as adopters, so they adopt too and their circles become 
darkened. Now in panel (d), all of the remaining agents (3, 6, 7, and 8) have at least one-third of 
their neighbors adopting, so we darken their circles in panel (d). The result is one of complete 
adoption of atrocity acceptance on the network owing to a change in the threshold rule, all else 
constant. 
[Figure 12 about here] 
 In Figure 13 we return to our initial setup in which agents 5 and 10 are initial 
(exogenous) adopters and the threshold rule is f=½. Recall from Figure 10 that these conditions 
led to the complete contagion of atrocity acceptance on the network. Now we add to that 
scenario what again seems like a trivial adjustment. Specifically, we add a new neighborhood tie 
between agents 3 and 4 in Figure 13 as shown by the dashed line between them. Now trace the 
contagion on the network for this new scenario. In panel (b), agents 6 and 7 have at least half of 
their neighbors as adopters, so we darken their circles as they convert to adoption. Now agent 8 
has at least half of its neighbors adopting, so it adopts too leading to a darkened circle for 8 in 
panel (c). Finally, in panel (d) agent 9 converts which then facilitates the conversions of 11 and 
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12 to adoption. But note that none of the individuals in the top cluster of panel (d) convert. This 
is a surprising result, namely, that just one additional neighborhood tie among peace types in the 
top cluster allowed the whole cluster to be buffered against atrocity acceptance. In this example, 
a slightly denser network among peaceful types enables the cluster to resist being infected by the 
atrocity acceptance contagion.
3
 We will now see how this result can be generalized to any 
network structure with undirected ties and a threshold rule. 
[Figure 13 about here] 
3.3 Clusters as Obstacles to Cascades: A General Statement 
The previous subsection shows how the degree of contagion across a specifically contrived 
network can vary dramatically depending on seemingly small, even trivial, changes (“trembles”) 
in initial conditions, threshold rules, network structure, or number of links. Whether extensive or 
limited contagion of atrocity acceptance or rejection occurred on the network seemed almost 
idiosyncratic in the sense that a slight twist in a condition here or there could drastically alter the 
diffusion process. A question naturally arises: Can a more general statement be made about the 
diffusion (or lack thereof) of a substance across any network? More generally, we will show that 
groups within networks characterized by homophily (a relatively close or tightly-knit 
community) serve as “barriers to entry” to new behavior. Already we have seen an example of 
this idea in Figure 13. Specifically, when we added one neighborhood (or friendship) link, 
namely between agents 3 and 4, to the top cluster of individuals in the figure, we made that 
                                                          
3
 The contagion of atrocity acceptance across locales during mass atrocities is often dramatically uneven. Some 
locales seem immune to atrocity acceptance while others give way to a high level of atrocity actions quite rapidly. 
For the 1994 Rwandan genocide, McDoom (2014) presents empirical evidence that “cohesive communities 
resist[ed] elite attempts to divide them” (p. 34). Similarly, McDoom’s (2013) empirical evidence implies that as the 
number of peaceful to violent people in an individual’s neighborhood or household increases, the likelihood of this 
individual’s participation decreases. Network theory provides plausible explanations for such observations. 
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group within the network a slightly more tightly-knit community. In the example, the slight 
increase in the group’s tightness caused it to become a barrier to atrocity acceptance. 
 Following Easley and Kleinberg (2010, p. 502), we conceptualize a group of tied 
individuals within a network as a cluster of individuals with a certain degree of tightness or 
interconnection among them. Specifically, a cluster with density d is a set of actors such that 
each actor in the set has at least the ratio r of its tied friends in the set. Consider, for example, 
Figure 14 which is a reproduction of panel (a) of Figure 13 but with the tie between agents 3 and 
4 now a solid rather than a dashed line. Recall that the idea of atrocity acceptance was not able to 
break into the top cluster of agents (1–4) (see panel (d) of Figure 13). The density of that top 
cluster in Figure 13 is d=⅔, that is, each agent 1–4 has at least two-thirds of its friendship ties 
within the cluster of agents 1–4. Let agents 5–8 be a cluster as well. The density of that cluster is 
d=½. Finally, let individuals 9–12 be a cluster, with density of d=⅓. Hence, the cluster that was 
most dense in Figure 13 was the one cluster in which the contagion of atrocity acceptance did not 
spread given the initial conditions and the threshold fraction f. Meanwhile, the other two clusters 
in Figure 13 were not sufficiently dense to prevent the contagion given the initial conditions and 
the threshold fraction f.  
[Figure 14 about here] 
 In contexts such as the models depicted in this section, Easley and Kleinberg (2010, p. 
507) make the following claim: 
Claim: Consider a network in which there is a set of initial adopters of behavior A 
(atrocity acceptance in our context) with a threshold of fraction f for adopting A 
for remaining agents in the network.  
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(i) If the remaining network contains a cluster of density greater than 1−f, then the 
set of initial adopters will not cause a complete cascade. 
And 
(ii) For threshold f, if the initial set of adopters does not cause a complete cascade, 
the remaining network contains a cluster of density greater than 1−f. 
(For a proof, see Easley and Kleinberg, 2010, pp. 507–9.) 
Note how the Easley/Kleinberg (E/K) statement is fulfilled in Figure 14. With f=½, the network 
does contain a cluster with density greater than 1−f=½, namely, the top cluster with density d=⅔. 
It then follows that both (i) and (ii) in the E/K claim are satisfied. Note also how the E/K claim is 
supported in Figures 10 and 12 above. In both figures, the density of the top cluster is d=½ rather 
than d=⅔. Part (i) of the E/K claim does not hold for those figures, and a complete cascade 
occurs for each. 
The more general principle associated with the E/K model is that tightly-knit 
communities serve as barriers to entry to contagion. This can be good news or bad news for 
atrocity contagion. Just as a tight-knit community might be more likely to resist atrocity 
acceptance, a tight-knit community could also be more resistant to peacefulness toward an out-
group. As Amartya Sen (2006, p. 1) writes: “identity can also kill—and kill with abandon.” 
4. Network Tentacles of Atrocity Perpetration 
The models covered up to this point focus on the diffusion of atrocity acceptance or the 
resistance to atrocity across a population or within a neighborhood (locale) of individuals. The 
people over which such diffusion processes play out are assumed to be from the in-group. Even 
within a population and even within neighborhoods in which atrocity becomes acceptable, there 
is still the matter (from the architect’s point of view) of bringing force to bear to destroy the out-
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group. The bringing of such force involves networks of individuals and organizations including 
troops to carry out the killing and prevent the victims from fleeing, bureaus and logisticians to 
manage equipment and other supplies for the troops, commanders to organize operations, and 
businesses to provide the implements of people-group destruction. Much like the “tooth-to-tail 
ratio” is used in the military planning literature to summarize the many facets of networks 
involved in preparing for and conducting war, we conceive of “networked tentacles of atrocity 
perpetration” along similar lines. In this section, we offer a stylized linear quadratic model of 
network tentacles of atrocity perpetration.  
4.1 Basic Setup of the Linear Quadratic Model of Atrocity Tentacles 
Figure 15 is a highly stylized depiction of a social network designed to bring tentacles of out-
group destruction to three villages, A, B, and C. At the center of the network is player 1 who is 
the atrocity architect. Moving out from the center are three people, players 2, 3, and 4, who are 
the regional managers or bureau heads associated with villages A, B, and C, respectively. 
Finally, agents 5–10 represent commanders of troops carrying out atrocities in their assigned 
locales. For the moment, ignore the w numbers in the figure. 
 Assume that each individual player, i, in the network in Figure 15 chooses a level or 
intensity of an action, xi ≥ 0, assumed to be action or harm against the out-group. Following the 
linear quadratic model (LQM) from the social networking literature (e.g., Jackson, 2008), each 
player’s utility or payoff is given by: 
 𝑈𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖𝑥𝑖 −
𝑏𝑖
2
𝑥𝑖
2 + ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑗   ,𝑗≠𝑖        (5) 
where ai ≥ 0 and bi > 0 are benefit and cost scalars, respectively, and wij≥ 0 is the weight or 
importance that player i places on player j’s action (Jackson, 2008, p. 290). Equation (5) implies 
that each unit of xi brings to player i marginal benefits of 𝑎𝑖 + ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑗≠𝑖  (i.e., additional benefits 
30 
 
per additional unit of action) and marginal costs of bixi. The wij parameter captures strategic 
complementarities (when wij>0) among linked agents. This aspect of equation (5) captures the 
increase in i’s self-perceived well-being when j’s positive action interacts with i’s positive action 
(xixj). The reasons for i’s increased well-being from j’s action could be multiple, including 
feelings of comradery from having a person that one is directly connected to operating for the 
“cause” as well—that is, a peer effect in which my linked counterpart’s higher action causes me 
to want to engage in a higher action too (e.g., to show myself well within the in-group)—or 
information flows among networked agents that enhance the “ideological necessity” of 
destroying the out-group. 
 Assume now that each agent i maximizes Ui in (5) by choosing xi, with all other elements 
in (5) treated parametrically. This leads to the following reaction function for i (Jackson, 2008, p. 
291): 
 𝑥𝑖 =
𝑎𝑖
𝑏𝑖
+ ∑
𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑏𝑖
𝑥𝑗𝑗≠𝑖     or     𝑥𝑖 − ∑
𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑏𝑖
𝑥𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 =
𝑎𝑖
𝑏𝑖
.     (6) 
The system of reaction functions then can be written in matrix algebra format as:  
 Ax=B           (7) 
where A is the 10x10 matrix of coefficients that multiply the x variables, x is the 10x1 vector of 
xi variables, and B is the 10x1 vector of ai/bi terms. The solution to (7) is  
 𝑥∗ = 𝐴−1𝐵    ,          (8) 
where A
-1
 is invertible and the inverse of A and x is nonnegative. 
4.2 Numerical Example of LQM Model 
To illustrate the workings of the model in the previous subsection, we begin with the assumption 
that the odd-numbered commanders (5, 7, and 9) favor atrocities against the out-group but the 
even-numbered commanders (6, 8, and 10) are uncomfortable bystanders:  They would rather not 
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carry out atrocities but also do not want to disobey orders and try to rescue victims. To give 
specific numbers to Figure 15 and to the equations of the model, assume that ai=2, bi=1, wij=0.2, 
and wii=0 for i=1–5, 7, and 9 and ai=0, bi=1, wij=0, and wii=0 for i=6, 8, and 10. The numerical 
values for the w terms are labeled in Figure 15. Equation (7) would then be: 
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Following equation (8), the solution to (9) is: 
 x1*  5.81  
 x2*  6.36 
 x3*  6.36 
 x4*  6.36 
 x5* = 3.28  .       (10) 
 x6*  0     
 x7*  3.28     
 x8*  0     
 x9*  3.28     
 x10*  0     
 
 The aggregate amount of actions in (10) is X*=36.7. (We note that the interpretation of 
the amount of harm caused is unclear. A simple assumption, given symmetry in Figure 10, is to 
divide 36.7 by 3 (=12.2) and assume that this is the amount of harm brought to each village. 
32 
 
Another interpretation is to assume that the actions of the architect, player 1, is purely public 
such that x1*=5.81 applies to each of the three tentacles. This then would give [(36.7−5.81)/3] + 
5.81 = 16.1] units of harm directed to each village. Although obviously relevant in the real 
world, the interpretation does not matter for our modeling purposes here.) 
 The atrocity network in Figure 15 and the solution in equation (10) assume that the even-
numbered commanders are not supportive of atrocity (their ai values were zero and their link 
weight terms with others were zero). Assume now that such commanders are replaced with 
“willing executioners” (Goldhagen, 1996). For simplicity, we assume all commanders now have 
the parameter values of the odd-numbered commanders in equation (9). The aggregate output of 
the tentacle model rises from X*=36.7 units of harm to X*=62.6 (a 71 percent increase), a rather 
large numeric increase on network output from a relatively small policy change of replacing 
three unwilling commanders in the field.  
4.3 Comparative Statics Analysis of LQM Model 
We now summarize various comparative static results for the solution of the general LQM model 
in equation (8) and also with numerical examples. Following Jackson (2008, pp. 292–3) and 
Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou (2006), assume ai=a and bi=b for all agents i, but 
continue to assume that the weight parameters wij≥0 can be heterogeneous. Under these 
conditions, it can be shown that the he equilibrium levels of harmful actions in (8) can also be 
represented by (see Jackson, 2008, p. 292): 
 𝑥∗ =
𝑎
𝑏
(I −
1
𝑏
𝑤)
−1 𝑎
𝑏
𝟏  ,      (11) 
where I is the identity matrix, w is the weight parameters matrix, and 1 is an nx1 vector of ones. 
From (11), an increase in the benefit parameter a or a decrease in the cost parameter b will 
increase each agent’s x value in the vector x*. It also follows that an increase in any one of the wij 
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terms in matrix w will increase the equilibrium level of harm for each agent in the network who 
has a directed (one-way) path to agent i (see Jackson, 2008, p. 292 for a proof).  
 Condition (11) is also amenable to the analysis of Key Player Policy (KPP) (Ballester, 
Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou, 2006). The key player is the one whose removal causes the 
production on the network to decrease the most assuming that the remaining players re-optimize 
their actions. Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou (2006) identify the key player in a condition 
like (11) based upon a Bonacich (1987) network centrality measure, C
B
. The Bonacich centrality 
measure for an actor counts the number of all of the paths that emanate from that actor’s node, 
weighted by a decay factor so that an agent’s reach decreases with the lengths of the paths 
(Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou, 2006, p. 1404). Following Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, 
and Zenou (2006) and Jackson (2008, p. 292), assume that the a and b terms in the LQM are the 
same for each actor and that any heterogeneity on the network comes only through the link 
weights, wij. Further assume that 1/b is small enough so that C
B
 is well-defined and nonnegative 
(Jackson, 2008, p. 292). It follows that the equilibrium levels of harm on the network are 
(Jackson, 2008, p. 292): 
 𝑥∗ =
𝑎
𝑏
(𝟏 + 𝐶𝐵),         (12) 
where 1 is an nx1 vector of ones, n is the number of actors on the network, and 𝐶𝐵is a vector of 
Bonacich centrality measures, which in turn are functions of the b cost parameter and the matrix 
of weight links, w. Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou (2006) show that the largest reduction 
in the network’s output occurs from the removal of the actor with the highest value of a variant 
of the Bonacich centrality measure (see Jackson, 2008, pp. 292-293). While we do not pursue 
these technical matters here (as indeed the literature knows of multiple centrality measures, each 
with its own good uses), the point is that network theory can help identity key players whose 
34 
 
removal from the network will damage its productity. For a high-level empirical application of 
Key Player Policy to fighting among armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), and its attendant atrocities, see König, et al. (2017). 
5. Contesting Networks of Atrocity Perpetration and Prevention 
There are four general types of interventions that third parties could attempt to impose on a 
network to prevent atrocity: (1) Deployment of various “carrots and sticks” to change the 
benefits and costs of individuals on the network such that less hostility is generated (i.e., atrocity 
preventing comparative statics), (2) nullification of one or more key players on the network, 
and/or other centrally important actors, and/or some or all of the links among atrocity supporting 
actors, (3) insertion of resistance actors (saboteurs) at key places in the network, and (4) insertion 
of a third party’s “tentacles of atrocity prevention” to directly contest the atrocity-producing 
organization’s work.  In this section, we model the latter of these alternatives as well as 
providing brief discussion of (1) and (2). 
 Assume an atrocity perpetrating network has i=1, ..., n atrocity tentacles in which xi0 
units of harm are being directed per tentacle against an out-group. Think of the i’s as locations in 
geographic space and/or in time. Similarly, assume a network of third party helpers directs yi0 
units of atrocity resistance to each of the perpetrator’s tentacles to directly contest the efforts of 
the perpetrators. Assume the result of any contestation between the atrocity perpetrators and the 
atrocity preventers is governed by the following Tullock-like contest success function (CSF): 
 𝑟𝑖
𝑠 =
𝑦𝑖
𝑥𝑖+𝜏𝑖𝑦𝑖
  ,              (13) 
where 𝑟𝑖
𝑠 is the ratio of the vulnerable population at location i that is saved from victimhood and 
τi0 is a technology of contestation parameter appropriate to location i, which depends on 
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geography and other elements that aid or hinder the protection of vulnerable people. Consistent 
with CSFs deployed in the literature, 𝑟𝑖
𝑠(𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖) = 𝑟𝑖
𝑠(0,0) = 1.  
 As a numerical example of the contestation model, return to the atrocity perpetrator’s 
network in Figure 15 under the assumption that all ten actors are perpetrators. Recall that the 
network’s aggregate number of units of harm directed to the out-group was X*=62.6. Assume 
each of the three tentacles of atrocity receive one-third of those units, or about 20.9 units of harm 
for each tentacle, which we will round to 21 units for simplicity. Suppose a network of third 
party actors generates a total of Y*=42 units of action to directly contest the 63 units of harm of 
the atrocity network. If the third party deploys 14 units of contestation to each atrocity tentacle 
and if τi=1 for each i, then 40 percent of the vulnerable population at each tentacle location will 
be protected and 60 percent will be lost.
4
  
  A second approach to modelling contesting networks is to assume that each network 
produces an aggregate output. Such outputs can be thought of as efforts or “weapons” in the 
contest between the networks in which the outcome of the struggle would be modeled by a 
contest success function (CSF). For example, the aggregate output of the atrocity perpetrating 
network is X*=62.6 when all commanders are on board. Suppose a third party brought Y=50 
units to contest the actions of the atrocity-perpetrating network. A simple ratio-form CSF would 
be p=Y/(X+Y)=50/(62.6+50)=0.44 where p is the proportion of the vulnerable civilian population 
that survives the atrocity network’s assault or the probability that any given vulnerable civilian 
survives. In this example, 44 percent of the vulnerable civilian population would survive, but 0 
percent would survive if there was no third party help (Y=0). Once more, we do not pursue these 
                                                          
4
 An alternative interpretation is that there will be a 0.4 probability of survival for each vulnerable person at each 
location and the expected values will be that 40 percent of each vulnerable population survives at each location.  
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matters here and only point to the potential value of bringing explicit network theory-induced 
reasoning to bear on real world cases of mass atrocities such as genocides. 
6. Conclusions 
We began the article with seven puzzles and, in the text that followed, showed that concepts 
from network theory help address all seven puzzles. Even though each real-world case of mass 
atrocity is somehow “special” (hence the very many case histories), all of them would seem to 
emerge from a unified underlying structure, thus linking highly detailed “micro” level studies to 
a “macro” level general theory of mass atrocity. The theory identifies key elements regarding 
initial conditions, diffusion processes, adoption and imitation rates, threshold and neighborhood 
effects, network structure, mutiplex networks, cost and benefit considerations (including 
psychological costs and benefits such as feelings of animosity or amity toward others), and so 
on. Depending on the particular constellation of these and other parameters in one or more 
networks, the promise of network theory is that real-world cases of mass atrocity can be 
“recreated” theoretically. To the degree that this effort succeeds, it is then possible to also link 
what is known from case studies and other efforts about mass atrocity intervention and 
prevention to network theory, as we have indicated in several instances above (e.g., the Key 
Player Policy or location-specific interventions on a network). 
 This article has only begun to apply network concepts and models to mass atrocity onset, 
spread, and prevention. Numerous extensions are possible. For diffusion over a population (and 
prevention of diffusion), much research terrain is still to be explored on adapting SI, SIR, SIS, 
and SIRS models from the epidemiology literature to mass atrocities. For diffusion over smaller 
groups (for example, neighborhoods) in which network characteristics are critical for 
understanding the spread or prevention of mass atrocities, much more is to be learned about  how 
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small (even trivial) “trembles” on the network can set off a contagion of mass atrocity 
acceptance or to stop the contagion before it takes off. For models of tentacles of atrocity 
perpetration, other “market structures” can be modeled including Stackelberg-like behavior in 
which the atrocity perpetrators’ harming actions are given and a third party optimally allocates 
efforts on the network to maximize the saving of lives. Similarly, the set of reaction functions for 
both the atrocity actors and the third party intervenors can be modeled to find the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium. The CSF on networks approach can be further refined by assuming that the 
competing networks allocate their efforts to particular locales of contestation in which each 
locale has its own CSF and the leaders of each network are strategic in their decision-making.  
Furthermore, the contesting networks approach to modeling atrocity onset, spread, and 
prevention is amenable to analysis of resistance actors (saboteurs) at key places in the network.   
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